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Abstract: 
Three proof requirements as essential for a sustainable land registration system. 
These were proof of identity, proof of ownership, and authority to deal. Our attention 
in this paper is drawn to the latter two requirements and will ask whether the 
introduction of the Property Exchange of Australia (PEXA), and its underpinning 
regulatory regime will meet the concerns that we have in relation to proof of 
ownership and authority to deal. In drawing out some problems with PEXA, we then 
offer an innovative idea, sourced from the transfer of equities that could serve to 
generate discussion on how we can ensure the Torrens system of land registration is 
sustainable for another 160 years. 
 
Introduction 
 
When registries are in place, there is a tendency to take their 
services for granted and consider their costs unnecessary.  In 
contrast, when registries are lacking, the benefits of creating 
registries are often exaggerated and their costs minimised.2 
 
Automation of land registry dealings is topical. The drivers for change are irresistible.  
As we move into the 21st-century, existing paper based systems are regarded as 
outmoded and unsafe.  In light of modern expectations of performance they are seen 
as slow to operate, cumbersome and expensive.  Being paper based, they are also 
open to abuse, in a way not envisaged before computer imaging and photocopying 
became common place.3  In line with government directives to modernise, 
automation is often a top contender for the “action now” basket.   
 
However, there have been casualties4 and false starts.5 For example, in the 
consultation phase to the proposed introduction of the Land Registration (Electronic 
Conveyancing) Rules 2011 in the United Kingdom, criticism was so widespread and 
broad ranging that plans to allow e-transfers were shelved, with the development 
                                                          
1 Respectively, Auckland University of Technology, University of Tasmania & Queensland University of Technology (Contact 
person is Lynden.Griggs@utas.edu.au). 
2 Benito Arruňada, Institutional Foundations of Personal Exchange, (University of Chicago Press, 2011) at 195. 
3 Rod Thomas, Rouhshi Low and Lynden Griggs “Australasian Torrens Automation, Its Integrity, and the Three Proof 
Requirements” [2013] NZ L Rev 227 [“Three Proof Requirements”]. 
4 It is reported the UK Registry wrote off nearly £11m in funds, expended in developing automation proposals. See Catherine 
Baksi “Land Registry drops e-transfer move” The Law Society Gazette 7 July 2011; http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/61246.article.  
See also the comments detailed in Land Registry, Report on responses to e-conveyancing secondary legislation part 3, 2011.  
See Land Registry Annual Report and Accounts 2010/11, at 55, n 1. 
5 A prior Victorian Scheme failed after expenditure of an estimated amount of some AUD$40-AUD$50 million.  The failure was 
attributed to institutional lenders not being willing to endorse and back the introduction of the scheme.  See Reduced Torrens 
Protection, at 249, n 106. Further development of the English system has also been halted: See the comments detailed in Land 
Registry, Report on responses to e-conveyancing secondary legislation part 3, 2011. 
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time and money to go into the delivery systems of electronic documents.6 
Emblematic of the concerns raised were the following comments7: 
“I am a licensed conveyancer, and I have never seen anything so complicated 
in my life…I also think it is wide open to fraud”; 
“[I]t is not adequately secure and could open [the] door to increased fraud”; 
“We wish to reiterate our concerns about the additional risks conveyancers and 
borrowers are exposed to as a result of the introduction of electronic 
signatures. In particular, we have concerns regarding the consistency of the 
new procedures with underlying general principles of law.” 
“There is likelihood of a higher risk of fraud or forgery if other people have 
access to the PC or can get access to the authentication grid.” 
“[W]e are concerned that the basic premise of e-transfers will be wide open to 
fraud. The opening of the Register itself has given rise to widespread abuse 
and the current proposals are bound to make matters worse. For example, 
there have been several instances where transfers have been registered and 
mortgages created without the true owner’s knowledge.” 
These criticisms led to the Registrar in the United Kingdom abandoning further plans 
to extend the electronic network.8 
The tenor of these English comments suggests that any initial rush of enthusiasm in 
Australia needs to be accompanied with an understanding of both issues and risks. 
This is especially so if the system being automated is a Torrens based system.  This 
is because a key component of Torrens is that registration is guaranteed by the 
State, in the absence of the new title holder being found guilty of fraud. 
 
In our earlier article,9 we proposed three key criteria for comparing and evaluating 
the credibility of the automation of the Australian and New Zealand land registries. 
These were proof of: 
 
1. identity; 
2. ownership; and 
3. authority to deal. 
These emanate from an understanding that any modern land registration system 
must provide security of tenure for the land holders, it must encompass and 
recognise the significant land rights that impact on the majority of the population, 
and in its use it must be trusted.  The stakeholders involved (particularly land 
owners and mortgagees) must be comfortable that the system is meeting these 
expectations. “[I]f these criteria are not generally met then there is a fundamental 
                                                          
6 See the comments detailed in Land Registry, Report on responses to e-conveyancing secondary legislation part 3, 2011. 
7 Land Registry, above n 6, section 4 of document – neither page nor paragraph numbers included in original document. 
8 Land Registry, above n 6 
9 Rod Thomas, Rouhshi Low and Lynden Griggs “Australasian Torrens Automation, Its Integrity, and the Three Proof 
Requirements” [2013] NZ L Rev 227 [“Three Proof Requirements”]. 
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problem with system”.10  How are these criteria to be met? Verify that the person 
transacting is who he/she says they are, that they are the true owner of the land, and 
critically, that they have the right to deal in that land. Our conclusions were that the 
approaches to the introduction of electronic conveyancing had, as far as practical 
(though certainly not without qualification), met the first requirement of verification of 
the identity of the individual, but had failed to connect that person to the interest in 
the land, or their potential right to deal with that interest. In this article we suggest 
that electronic conveyancing systems have failed to address this issue, but have the 
potential to do so. We offer a solution adopting the thinking and models associated 
with the introduction of electronic stock exchange transactions. To do this, we 
provide a synopsis of the current state of automation in Australia, before highlighting 
our concerns that PEXA will need to consider before it renders fully operational its 
electronic land exchange. We conclude with a range of solutions, primary of which is 
our proposed Australian Stock Exchange solution. 
 
Part 1: Current state of automation in Australia 
National Electronic Conveyancing Law in Australia 
Assented to on November 20, 2012 New South Wales became the first and host 
jurisdiction of the national electronic conveyancing law.  A product of the coalition of 
Australian governments’ desire to achieve a seamless national economy, national 
electronic conveyancing should deliver, as electronic stock exchanges did for the 
liquidity and transferability of equities in corporate structures, a streamlined and 
more cost-effective mechanism to transfer interests in land. With Victoria and 
Queensland already on board, and other jurisdictions to follow, the key legislative 
plank in this reform is the Electronic Conveyancing (Adoption of National Law) Act 
2012 (NSW).  What this legislation does is establish the right to lodge documents 
electronically and to create a mutually accessible electronic workspace for 
stakeholders involved in the transfer of land, though in Australia and in the United 
Kingdom, (to be contrasted with New Zealand), the registrar still retains an 
overarching role and responsibility in ensuring the integrity of the register.11 
Part three of the legislation establishes the Electronic Lodgement Network (ELN), 
with this to be known by the acronym of PEXA (Property Exchange Australia).  This 
system stemming from the work of Property Exchange Australia Ltd, an unlisted 
public company owned by some of Australia’s largest financial institutions, together 
with the governments of Victoria, New South Wales, Queensland, and Western 
Australia. Property Exchange Australia will run the national property exchange and 
will be open to non-shareholders though separate from direct government oversight. 
Existing to support the operation of the legislative framework lies the Operating 
Requirements and the Participation Rules.12  Whereas the operating requirements 
                                                          
10 Ian P Williamson, ‘Best Practices for Land Administration Systems in Developing Countries’, Presentation to International 
Conference on Land Policy Reform, 25-27 July 2000, p15. 
11 See ss7 & 8 of the Electronic Conveyancing (Adoption of National Law) Act 2012. 
12 New South Wales Land and Property Information, NSW Participation Rules for Electronic Conveyancing, 6th September 2013 
(MPR); New South Wales Land and Property Information, NSW Operating Requirements for Electronic Conveyancing, 6th 
September 2013 (MOR). 
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put in place eligible eligibility criteria for the network operators and their obligations 
surrounding system security and integrity, critically, the risk management matrix 
within the operating requirements requires that there be no increased risk of fraud or 
error with the introduction of the electronic system. Consider the terms of clause 9.2: 
“Without limiting any other obligation under these Operating Requirements, the 
ELNO must use reasonable endeavours to ensure that the use of the ELN for 
the presentation for Lodgement of Conveyancing Transactions with the 
Registrar does not result in greater risk of fraud or error in those Conveyancing 
Transactions compared to the risk of fraud or error for comparable 
Conveyancing Transactions lodged in a paper medium.” 
Somewhat echoing this, clause 8 provides: “The ELNO must ensure that it does not 
do anything that is likely to diminish the overall security and integrity of the Titles 
Register or public confidence in the Titles Register.” The question we ask is whether 
this has been achieved given the three previously outlined proof requirements of a 
secure land transaction system. 
Allied to, and working in conjunction with the Operating Rules, the Participation 
Rules move to address these criteria, though the focus has always been on the 
element of verification of identity, the first proof requirement. Schedule eight imports 
measures in excess of the well-known 100 point identity check required to open a 
bank account.  A subscriber to the system must verify the identity of each client party 
that the subscriber intends to represent.  Unlike opening a bank account a face-to-
face interview is required with the subscriber needing to be satisfied that the person 
before them and the photographic ID that must accompany this interview represent 
one and the same person. The subscribers, such as solicitors, must have the 
nuanced visual skills to determine that the shape of the nose, eyes, mouth and 
cheek bones match the person shown in the photograph.  The participation rules 
establish a hierarchical level of document production with it necessary to show that 
the previous and better level is unavailable before proceeding to the next and 
weaker construct.  For example, category one is the starting point and requires an 
Australian passport plus an Australian drivers licence or proof of age card plus 
change of name or marriage certificate if necessary.  Category 2, for the person who 
doesn’t drive, requires a passport, plus birth or citizenship certificate, plus Medicare 
or Centrelink details, and change of name information if required. Category 3, for the 
person without a passport, provides that the person must show an Australian drivers 
licence or proof of age card plus birth certificate plus Medicare or Centrelink card, 
plus change of name or marriage certificate if necessary. For the Australian citizen 
without photo ID, category 4 requires that the subscriber use an Identifier Declaration 
to verify identity. This requires that both the person being identified and the identity 
declarant be present together for a face to face interview, and the subscriber needs 
to ensure that the declarant is an adult, has known the person being verified for at 
least 12 months, is not a relative nor a party to the transaction, and in certain 
circumstances coming within a category of occupation such as Bank Manager, 
Community Leader, Legal Practitioner, Doctor, Public Servant or Police Officer. 
Category 4 cannot be used for verification of identity in a foreign country, which 
mandates use of the first three categories, with verification required by an Australian 
Consular Officer, or Australian Diplomatic Officer, or where the person being verified 
is a member of the Australian Defence Force, a Competent Officer.  
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Given the ease in which documents can be falsely created, we do have some 
niggling concerns with the verification of identity requirements, but it is how the 
requirements of verification of ownership of land and authority to deal to which we 
primarily turn our attention. These latter proof requirements are dealt with under 
clause 6.4 of the Model Participation Rules – the subscriber must take reasonable 
steps to ensure that the client is entitled to enter into the conveyancing transaction.  
The Participation Rules also require the subscriber to obtain a client authorisation 
form from the client that the subscriber is representing13which will permit the 
subscriber to act on behalf of the client, including digitally sign electronic documents 
prepared in the electronic workspace by the subscriber on behalf of the client. 
This electronic workspace will be accessible by the subscribers representing the 
parties in the conveyancing transaction, and will require, prior to settlement, that the 
subscribers certify that verification of identity has been undertaken14 and that 
appropriate records will be retained for seven years to substantiate verification of 
identity and interestingly, the client’s right to enter into the conveyancing transaction 
(though this latter point is absent in the certification rules).15 
 
An Overview of our Concerns  
As can be seen from this outline and with a recognition that the move to electronic 
conveyancing is irresistible, how does the known risk of land fraud respond to this?  
Its response, as noted, has been to strengthen the verification of identity 
requirements. The authors are comfortable that the processes adopted for 
verification of identity are for the most part doable and appropriate and we 
acknowledge that this will respond to the notion of identity of user (the first proof 
criterion). Where we remain concerned lies in the capacity of the system to 
recognise that that person whose identity has been verified does indeed have the 
right to deal with that land, and the conveyancing agent acting on behalf of that 
landowner, can in fact connect the identity of that person to the land itself. In many 
respects, the MOR and MPR leaves these questions unanswered. Apart from 
verification of identity of their client, they do not appear to have a need to connect 
that individual to the land or to the right to deal with that land. 
For example, the solicitor may be able to identify and verify that the person before 
them is John Smith, but can they in fact show that this is the John Smith, the owner 
of cadastre lot A.  If this is met, then our third proof requirement further asks that we 
know that John Smith can in fact deal with the property. The Participation Rules 
recognise this problem in Clause 6.4 “The Subscriber must take reasonable steps to 
establish that its Client is entitled to enter into the Conveyancing Transaction(s) 
identified in the Client Authorisation” but this offers no practical solution.  What is 
absent  is any indication as to how this needs to be done, though perhaps the 
thinking of the drafting officers in this regard is reflected with clause 6.4 followed by 
the verification of identity requirements (clause 6.5).  However, as we note 
                                                          
13 MPR clause 6.3 and schedule four. 
14 MPR clause 7.10 requiring subscribers to comply with the certification rules which are located in schedule 3 of the MPR. 
15 MPR clause 6.6 
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verification of identity and right to deal are separate and distinct proof elements in 
establishing the integrity of electronic conveyancing within land administrations 
systems based on title by registration.  And it is here where the fragmented nature of 
the Australian federal legislative framework becomes apparent with some 
jurisdictions abolishing or near to abolishing paper based certificates of title, whereas 
others seeing retention of hard copy certificate of titles as a critical security plank. In 
Australia, some have argued16 that the presence of the paper based certificate of 
title represents a firewall in the protection against land fraud,17 whereas jurisdictions 
such as Queensland and Western Australia are moving towards the abolition of 
hardcopy certificates of title - a consistent, clear national response unlikely.  
 
Part 3:  Possible measures to strengthen the second and third proof 
requirements in an automated system 
 
In this part, we seek to provide some possible solutions for strengthening the second 
and third proof requirements. In doing this we borrow from the methods used for the 
transfer of equities on the Australian Stock Exchange. Importantly, the proposals we 
favour, and the questions we ask have cross-jurisdictional application, rather than 
being state or country specific. As an example of the latter, New South Wales has 
proposed that in that state mortgagees and owners lodge a separate consent to any 
dealing being registered; that is that there be separate proof undertaken of the right 
to deal with the interest in the land.18  It is not yet clear how that proof will be 
undertaken.19   
 
Lessons Learnt from the Transfer of Shares – an outline of how shares are 
transferred 
Our reason for looking towards the stock market on which to model our solution 
emanates from the same traits that underlie the introduction of both systems (the 
pressures to automate and the efficiencies this can bring) and the need for a similar 
outcome (security of title, and ease of transaction). While there may be a greater 
volume in the buying and selling of securities compared to that of land, our 
contention is that if the process of buying and selling securities can be facilitated by 
the use of PINs and universal account numbers, then the same system could 
theoretically also work for land transactions and by so doing address some, but not 
all of the concerns around verifying identity of ownership of land, and the capacity to 
deal with that land.  
The common elements of the two systems are represented in the following diagram.  
                                                          
16 See New South Wales Land Registry, Certificate of Title Solutions for Concurrent Electronic and Paper-Based Conveyancing 
(22 September 2011) – prepared by Clayton Utz (Clayton Utz Report). 
17 “The practical effect of holding the CT/CoRD (Control of the Right to Deal) is: to give the first-ranking registered mortgagee 
with the CT/CoRD a veto over the creation of later interests (especially subsequent mortgages) by the registered proprietor; 
and to give the registered proprietor who has the CT/CoRD some protection against fraudulent dealing with the title by requiring 
a separate act of producing the C/T.”  (Clayton Utz Report)above n 16, 1.4. 
18 CoRD stands for “control of right to deal.” 
19 See the training video relating to CoRD dealings released by the Registrar-General of NSW.  NSW Land and Property 
Information; National Electronic Conveyancing in NSW 
http://necnsw.lpi.nsw.gov.au/about_us/announcements/control_of_the_right_to_deal_training_video 
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Australian process of transferring shares 
 
 
Process of Transferring Land (Automated System) 
 
 
Person seeking to buy or 
sell shares 
Accesses online account 
with stockbroker using 
HIN and PIN 
Order is placed and 
effected through CLOB 
(Closing Limit Order 
Book) 
CHESS processes 
settlement, and monies 
transferred 3 days after 
trade 
Statements sent to 
owners highlighting 
change in ownership 
Person seeking to buy or 
sell land signs contract  
Engages solicitor/conveyance – 
this  person shouldverify 
identity. Would rarely verify 
authority to deal. Holding or 
access to C/T seen as sufficient 
Digital workspace 
created where both 
vendor and purchasers 
agents engage 
Details forwarded to 
Land Registry for change 
(AUS), or change effected 
by agent NZ 
Settlement from agent to 
client 
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In terms of the development of the Australian stock exchange, two stages were 
particularly critical - the development of Flexible Accelerated Security Transfer 
(FAST) and the introduction of the Clearing House Electronic Sub-Register System 
(CHESS).  
FAST 
In 1989, FAST was introduced with two key foci. The first was to allow security 
holders the choice whether they held a certificate of title as evidence of ownership 
within a company. The second was to allow companies the right to establish 
uncertificated securities register. These two elements encompassed the following 
points: 
 A share investor being identified by way of a Holder Identification Number 
(HIN). This number included a ‘check digit’ for security; 
 Transfer by way of paper via the broker executing the agreement on behalf of 
their client; 
 A transfer would only be registered if the broker acting on behalf of the 
investor stated the correct HIN. The share investor and the broker would have 
established communication and verified identity through some means 
(currently a Personal Identification Number (PIN)); 
 The extension of the guarantee fund to cover the possibility of increased risk 
for fraudulent transactions. 
Once FAST had successfully implemented the use of HINs, the next key step was to 
remove the requirement of transfer by paper. This was to be achieved via CHESS. 
 
CHESS 
Introduced in 1994, the key components of this included: 
 Electronic registration of title on CHESS administered by the Australian Stock 
Exchange (ASX); 
 Electronic clearing of funds; 
 Shareholders were informed of changes to their shareholdings by way of a 
CHESS holding statement (much like a bank account statement); 
 Further integration and consolidation in the use of HINs; 
 As noted above, should a person not wish to have an arrangement with a 
broker and the use of HIN to identify themselves, the investor could choose to 
have a Security Reference Number (SRN) issued by the company as a 
means to connect that investor to their holding in the company; 
 Those with access to CHESS (such as brokers) would be identified by 
Participant Identifiers (PID) and by User Identification Codes (UICs); 
 Operating Rules would support the arrangements. 
Thus in Australia, an investor in shares has two alternatives. The investor can have a 
Holder Identification Number (HIN) which connects to a broker via a PIN and allows 
multiple holdings in different companies to be held under this one account number. A 
10 
 
second alterative is that rather than a HIN, an investor can choose to have a Security 
Reference Number (SRN) for each individual company in which they are a part-
owner.   
It is the benefits of HIN which we see as logically analogous to our proposal. To 
assist in understanding, the following table lists the advantages of CHESS 
sponsorship over Issuer Sponsorship20, with the third column highlighting how we 
see it operating in a land environment (with this aspect detailed further below) 
 
Shares held in CHESS Shares held via Issuer 
Sponsorship 
Land Interests held via an 
Account Number and PIN 
Legal title is electronically 
registered 
Legal title is electronically 
registered 
Legal title electronically 
registered. 
Broker controls shares Controlled by the company 
usually through a share 
registry 
In Australia PEXA (Property 
Exchange Australia) will 
control this. 
One HIN for all 
shareholdings 
A SRN for each particular 
company in which I own 
shares 
One account number of all 
land interests. 
I contact the broker to 
change personal details 
I have to contact each 
company (or its particular 
share registry) to change 
details 
PEXA is contacted to 
change personal details.  
Shares are ready to trade 
immediately 
A broker will need to move 
shares onto CHESS to 
trade 
Land is transferable 
provided evidence of 
ownership and authority to 
deal is established via the 
account number and PIN. 
When account changes 
are made, a statement 
will be issued by CHESS. 
Each individual share 
registry will need to issue 
an account statement 
when changes occur. 
Land Registry offices will 
issue a statement 
identifying changes.  
 
We are not saying that adopting this solution will eliminate fraud completely. In fact, 
the ASX has had to issue participants with guidelines and reminders of the 
importance of security around the identifier numbers – this being accompanied with 
an exhortation to verify identity with some precision and to exercise considerable 
caution where there appear to be inconsistencies.21 However, our submission is that 
if billions of dollars of securities can be exchanged through this method, is the unique 
nature of land such that it, or a variant of it could not be adopted.  
                                                          
20 Paraphrased from Benefits of CHESS v Issuer Sponsorship, <asx.com.au/products/chess-benefits-issuer-sponsorship.htm> 
accessed September 10 2012. 
21 ASX Circular, “Security around Issuer Sponsored Holding Details”, 345/11. They noted (at 1) that “ASX has been informed of 
several instances where clients’ SRN details have been obtained by third parties who have then established (or attempted to 
establish) an account with a participant in an attempt to illegally dispose of the clients’ securities.” This 2011 advice reflected an 
earlier bulletin that highlighted the rise in identity fraud. ASX CHESS Bulletin, “Incidences of Fraud”, P2003/266. See also ASX 
Circular, "Apparent Fraud Committed against Market Participants”, 210/05. 
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Applying the Lessons of how Shares are Transferred - the Landowner with a 
PIN 
Building on from the previous material, our solution for enhancing the second and 
third proof requirements that we have identified is the use of a Personal Identification 
Number (PIN) linked to a ‘land account’. An entity that owns interests in land, be it 
freehold, leasehold, incorporeal hereditament, or something else recognised by the 
land registration system will have a unique account number (a ‘land account’) that 
attaches to all their interests of an equivalent status, similar to that for a person 
owning shares.. The account number would remain for that individual and be 
available for further transactions into the future, notwithstanding that any interest 
presently held “in that account” had been sold and removed. As with HIN’s the land 
account would contain a check digit for further security. Access to the land account 
would be via the account holder’s PIN. A person wanting to transact in respect of 
that interest would be required to produce the PIN in respect of his/her account. This 
provides the missing link between the identity that is verified with the capacity or 
authority to deal with that land.  
An illustration of how the system would operate is given as follows. 
 
Account number Interest in 
12345722 0123 Freehold in 12 Goldstone Street, Sydney 
0224 Leasehold in 5 Trump Street, Melbourne 
0325 Right of way over 3 Goon Place, Hobart 
0426 Mortgage secured over 12 Basil Street, Brisbane 
Thus, to transfer an interest in land, the following would occur.  The conveyancer 
would be required to obtain access to the system. The dealing will be set up “on 
line.” In addition to identifying the interest by the title memorial reference/street 
address, the conveyancer would refer to be client’s land account number.  Thus if 
the interest to be transferred was the fee simple of a particular parcel of land, (above 
given as 12 Goldstone Street, Sydney) the conveyancer would also be required to 
enter the relevant account number (above given as 123457 01 into the online 
dealing).  However to authorise the actual transfer of this interest, the client must 
then input his/her PIN number into the system. This authenticates that client as the 
owner of that land account and within that, all the corresponding interests held in that 
account. Once recognised as being the owner of that interest and possessing the 
right to deal, the transaction can then be processed.  Hence there is a link between 
the identity of the client and the client’s ownership and right to deal in the property. 
                                                          
22 123456 represents the individual’s land account number that is unique to that individual   
23 01 represents freehold 
24 02 represents leasehold 
25 03 represents incorporeal hereditaments 
26 04 represents mortgagee interests 
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This can be contrasted with what is proposed in PEXA. The client signs an 
authorisation form, the conveyancer verifies identity, the online dealing is prepared 
by the conveyancer, who digitally signs it, with it then sent electronically to the land 
registry and title change is effected (how this latter point will operate in PEXA is 
currently unclear). The first proof requirement is met but not the second or third. 27   
What we are saying is that the inclusion of specialist account numbers and 
associated PINS provides greater protection because the fraudulent person must not 
only have forged identity documents to fool the identity verification process, the 
fraudulent person must also need to know the land account and corresponding PIN 
to bypass the second and third proof requirements.  The system is more secure 
when all three proof requirements are operational and the perpetration of fraud is 
made more difficult when all three proof requirements need to be met rather than just 
one.   
However, the primary weakness in this system is that its effectiveness is dependent 
entirely on the holder of the land account, the land account holder must not reveal 
the PIN to anyone. Revelation would defeat the system. Realistically however, it is 
highly likely that the account holder will share the PIN number with immediate family 
members, who may be prime contenders for undertaking fraud. Further, given that 
land transactions happen rarely, it is likely then the account holder would write down 
the account number and corresponding PIN which, if the fraudulent person is a close 
family member or friend, can be easily intercepted and misused.28 So this system 
may not work well against fraud perpetrated by close family members but may work 
better against unknown perpetrators. Finally, the PIN system may not prevent fraud 
in situations where the fraudulent person is able to impersonate an account holder 
and obtain a PIN from the system (for example, the fraudulent person could contact 
the system, report that he/she has forgotten the account number and PIN, is 
informed of the account number and told to reset the PIN). An analogous example in 
our current system can be seen in Challenger Managed Investments Ltd and Anor v 
Direct Money Corporation Pty Ltd and Others29 where a person was able to obtain a 
new certificate of title after falsely representing to the NSW Land Registry that their 
copy of the certificate had been destroyed in a cyclone. This replacement certificate 
was then used to obtain a mortgage over the land. 
PIN selection is also critical. The username password system or username PIN 
system is the most common authentication system used in the online world. But 
passwords can be the ‘[A]chilles’ heel of many systems’.   Where password selection 
                                                          
27 Such ideas are not new. See for example, the suggestion by Rod Thomas, for the New Zealand LandonLine system in C 
MacLennan, ‘Mortgage Frauds Prompt Calls for System Changes (2006) 2 Law News 1. Also see Celia Hammond, 'The 
Abolition of the Duplicate Certificate of Title and its Potential Effect on Fraudulent Claims Over Torrens Land' (2000) 8 
Australian Property Law Journal 115 (issuing of a folio identification number or electronically recognised number (such as a 
PIN) upon registration to the registered proprietor or mortgagee. This number would have to be produced at settlement to 
enable registration of subsequent dealings, be they transfers or mortgages) and Lynden Griggs, in referring to the work of R 
Cocks and J. Barry, (“Electronic Conveyancing: Challenges for the Torrens System”, (2001) 8 APLJ 270)  in  suggesting the 
use of a ‘Landcard’ that would operate like a credit card and can be verified by a password: L. Griggs, “Torrens Title in a Digital 
World”, [2001] MurUEJL 20, [37]. See also DA Whitman, “Digital Recording of Real Estate Conveyances”, (1999) 32 J. Marshall 
L. Rev. 227. 
28 See Celia Hammond, 'The Abolition of the Duplicate Certificate of Title and its Potential Effect on Fraudulent Claims Over 
Torrens Land' (2000) 8 Australian Property Law Journal 115, 133: ‘The main problem with the issuing of an electronically 
recognized number over land is that unlike bank accounts, it is uncommon for people to make regular dealings over their land. 
A person could be issued with a number in 1999 and not need to use it again for 10-15 years. In the meantime, the electronic 
number would have to be recorded somewhere for future usage. This record could be lost or accessed by someone else in 
similar if not more circumstances than the current paper duplicates could be’. 
29 (2003) 59 NSWLR 452. 
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is left to the users of the system, users generally tend to select passwords that are 
memorable, such as mothers’ maiden names, birthdays, and other personal 
information.  Whist they may be easy to remember, they are also easy to guess and 
therefore susceptible to dictionary attacks. Albrecht also noted that it is also common 
to find users who share their passwords with others, or write down their passwords 
or re-use passwords for various applications so that the same password is used to 
access a secure work-related system as well as for other less secure applications 
such as Internet email.  Hence a fraudulent person who is able to guess the 
password for the Internet email would be able to use that same password to access 
all other applications which use the same password. PINs fare no better. In the case 
of credit cards, the PIN is a four digit number so that there are at most 10,000 
possibilities. Self-selection of the PIN may therefore mean that a few hundreds of 
numbers account for the huge majority of PINs in use.30 To overcome this problem, 
an additional security feature could be introduced – issuing the land account holder 
with a token, similar to that of an ATM card (‘land card’), activated by the PIN and 
linked to the land account. So the account holder must now produce the token and 
know the PIN in order to authorise the transaction. Using the above example, the 
account holder (or client) must insert the land card into a reader and input the PIN. 
The additional requirement of ‘something you have’ (token) and not just ‘something 
you know’ (PIN) theoretically improves security. But for our purposes, it is doubtful 
whether tokens would improve security for the same reasons outlined above (the 
rarity of land transactions in most cases would mean land account holders would 
probably not appreciate the need to keep the token in a secure location; the 
fraudulent person could also apply to the system, pretending to be a land account 
holder who has lost his/her token, and receive a new token).   
Regardless of whether tokens should be used to complement the PIN system, 
questions will also be raised as to: 
• Who should be responsible for managing and assigning the land account 
numbers? The most likely contender would be the land registry – rather than 
issuing paper certificates of title, the land registry would issue land account 
numbers, though issuing paper certificates of title would be considerably 
easier than issuing land accounts because the land account is tied to the 
registered proprietor who may have a multitude of interests whereas the 
certificate of title is tied to the land. Another consideration would be the PINS, 
if the account holder forgot his/her PIN, a mechanism would be required to 
enable the account holder to report the loss and to be able to re-set the PIN. 
All this would likely impose additional costs on land registry; 
• the automated land registration system must also be configured so that it has 
a field for clients (the land account holders) to input the land account number 
and PIN and the system must then send that data to the land registry 
database which would authenticate the client as being the owner of that land 
account (similar to that of a person accessing the ATM machine, the system 
authenticates that the person is the account holder via the insertion of the 
ATM card and correct PIN being inputted). This may create complications in 
the design of the system, more so if tokens (land cards) were used together 
with PINs because a card reader would be needed to read the land card; 
                                                          
30 David Argles, Alex Pease and Robert John Walters, “An improved approach to secure authentication and signing” (2007) 21st 
IEEE International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Application Workshops 
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• More importantly, could this PIN system bring potentially more large scale 
fraud when a person obtains both the account number and the PIN? In this 
scenario, they will be able to transfer large numbers of titles should the true 
owner be a property with freehold title to a number of parcels. And if the fault 
lay with the account holder (for example, by not keeping the PIN secure), 
should the account holder lose his/her right to compensation? 
 
Are there Easier Alternatives? 
We suspect that the complexity of the above may will present a hurdle that is hard to 
overcome, but by beginning the discussion we seek to generate debate and 
conversation as to how we can improve security and reduce the level of fraud and 
forgery within the Torrens system. What follows are some simpler measures which 
may also achieve an additional layer of protection.  
 
 
a. Flagged titles/Cautions noted on title/Registration stoppers 
 
One measure that could be put in place as a design feature of an automated system 
is the use of electronic flags or registration stoppers31 or cautions on title.32 . The 
registered owner could put a stopper on the title and any dealings in relation to that 
title would automatically raise a ‘flag’ and the registered owner is then advised in 
some way that his or her interest is to be dealt with.33  However, is not a form of 
consent per se, as it assumes consent is given if no protest is made. Alternatively, 
the system could generate a one-time PIN which is sent to the owner together with 
the advice. The owner must then input this one time PIN into the electronic 
workspace in order for the conveyancing transaction to proceed. In this way, the 
owner has provided consent. 
 
If adopted, it is important any flag or stopper appears prior to indefeasibility coming 
into play.  This is because in the absence of fraud, a bona fide transferee obtains the 
protection of indefeasibility. By contrast, cautions on title doesn’t prevent the 
operation of indefeasibility, merely defer its full effect for 20 years. 
 
 
b. On line Questionnaire  
 
This option has some appeal, although bearing the trademarks of something akin to 
Russian roulette. The registry could hold on file private information that is unique to 
both the owner and the property. Thus when a land holder’s interest is to be dealt 
with, the registry would require the “customer” to complete a randomly selected 
number of questions as a form of certification of ownership.  This can provide a 
double function of both certifying identification and ownership.  If questions are not 
answered within a set time, access can be denied.  Any new attempt would face a 
                                                          
31 Challenger Managed Investments Ltd v Direct Money Corp Pty Ltd (2003) 59 NSWLR 452, [25].  
32 Ss21-26 Land Titles Act 1980 (Tas) 
33 The England Wales Land Registry recommend lodging three separate addresses with the Registry in circumstances where 
fraud is considered possible.  See Land Registry for England and Wales.  Public Guide 17 – How to safeguard against property 
fraud, at [3.3] (updated 20 Jan 2014).  See  http://www.landregistry.gov.uk/public/guides/public-guide-17 
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fresh set of random questions. Similar systems are in place with online banking and 
my.gov.au. If a transaction is sought to be effected that has no precedence, the 
person, in addition to inputting the PIN, will be required to answer 2-3 previously 
selected questions. Another version of this could see the person having entered their 
PIN, being required to identify three tokens from a random selection provided on 
screen. 
 
Although the need to input personal information may cut out third party fraudsters, 
the proposal is vulnerable to abuse by the interest holders close associates.  
 
 
c) Immediate Indefeasibility subject to qualification 
 
Another option may be to adopt the proposal by the New Zealand Law Commission 
for its new Land Transfer Act34 that the dealing does not become indefeasible until a 
settled period after registration. This enables a period of grace for any registration to 
be challenged by an interested party.   
In a real sense, again, this proposal offers practical protection at little cost to the 
design of the automated system.  After all, any party who has a newly registered 
interest in the land is likely to take either possession, the benefit of rents or collect 
mortgage interest payments following completion of the transaction.  Thus there is 
an increased opportunity for discovering fraud or improper dealing after the 
registration date.  
 
However, the disadvantage may be considerable for the hapless registrant.  If 
challenged he or she may face the cost of proceedings and the uncertainty of 
litigation risk in seeking to defend his or her registration.  This party may be unaware 
of the circumstances giving rise to a claim that the title should be overturned.  The 
test proposed by the New Zealand Law Society for overturning a title is one of 
“manifest injustice” being shown, focusing on the personal circumstances of the 
dispossessed party.35 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper we canvassed a range of possible solutions for connecting identity with 
ownership and right to deal, our premise being that a system that possesses all three 
proof requirements will be more secure.  As the discussion shows, there are various 
possibilities.   
 
Our paper has also shown that questions with regards to determining who should 
carry the risk in terms of abuse of the register remain unclear and it is likely these 
questions will not be fully resolved until litigation transpires. What is certain is that 
too great a risk of abuse can lead to loss of public confidence in the register, and 
increased transactional costs. We must balance the potential the harshness of 
Torrens registration outcomes on the one hand, against the need to have a land 
transaction that is inexpensive, secure, and effective. 
                                                          
34 Rod Thomas “Reduced Torrens Protection; The New Zealand Law Commission Proposal for a New Land Transfer Act” 
[2011] NZ L Rev 715. 
35 See Law Commission, A New Land Transfer Act, s13 of proposed Land Transfer Bill (NZ). 
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It is important to reflect that introduction of safe automation initiatives do not 
necessarily require an immediate election of one fully automated system over 
another.  Steps can be taken towards automation, with manual processing kicking in 
at critical stages.  Then, over time, as systems develop and become more 
commercially safe and accepted, other parts can be automated.  However, one is 
reminded of Mrs Armitage’s bike.36  When she enthusiastically added too many 
gadgets to her bicycle, it became instable with obvious results.  Consequentially, if 
the drivers to automate are irresistible due perhaps to political directives, holding 
measures may be needed pending more sophisticated systems become available. 
 
No system should be introduced unless it is considered safe.  Steps made on an 
important front such as land registration should be risk free, until automation can be 
introduced with a margin of comfort.  
                                                          
36  Quentin Blake Mrs Armitage on Wheels (1999, Random House, London). 
